The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions

Matthew J. Clayton and S. Abraham Ravid

New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-

Abstract: This paper investigates how firms’ bidding behavior in various auctions is affected by capital structure. A theoretical model is developed where the first price sealed bid and the English auction are examined. We find as debt levels increase, firms tend to

Date: 1999-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nystfi:99-055

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