Durable Goods Monopoly with Network Externalities with Application to the PC Operating Systems Market

Nicholas Economides ()

New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-

Abstract: We analyze a model of multi-period monopoly in durable goods. Taking into consideration the special conditions of software markets, we assume that there are no used software markets and that manufacturers stop selling older software when they introduce a replacement model. We show that nominal as well as discounted (real) prices decrease over time but are above costs, thereby violating the Coase conjecture.

Keywords: MONOPOLIES; EXTERNALITIES; MARKET STRUCTURE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 1999
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Working Paper: Durable Goods Monopoly with Network Externalities with Application to the PC Operating Systems Market (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nystfi:99-17

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