A General Nonemptiness Result of the Core of a Production Economy with Asymmetric Information

I. Lefebvre

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The core of an economy consists of those attainable allocations of the economy which no group of agents (coalition) can "improve upon". This paper presents a concept of core of a production economy with a finite number of agents with asymmetric information, a continuum of states and an infinite number of commodities. It then states and proves a nonemptiness result of the core of this economy. The proof is based on a (quasi) fixed point theorem.

Keywords: INFORMATION; PRODUCTION; COALITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:1999.61

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