Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice and Entry on the Intermediate Market

Eric Avenel and C. Barlet

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies : standard technologies used by non-integrated firms, and non-standard technologies, reserved to integrated firms and implying the complete foreclosure of non-integrated firms.

Keywords: TECHNOLOGY; MONOPOLIES; COMPETITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Journal Article: Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market (2000)
Journal Article: Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:2000.18

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