Coalition-Proof Implementation of Competitive Equilibria on a Constrained Reinsurance Market

G. Bernis and Gaël Giraud

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We derive from Bernis [2000] a strategic mechanism which fully implements the set of competitive equilibria on a dynamically incomplete reinsurance market VIA Nash equilibria. The mechanism is feasible, and such that the set of coalition proof Nash equilibria coincides with that of Nash equilibria. We thus provide a general framework for the design of decentralized mechanisms on the reinsurance market whose outcomes are efficient even when collusion among insurers is allowed.

Keywords: MARKET; COMPETITION; INSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 G13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:2000.83

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