Ownership and Theories of the Firm: Some Missing Links Revealed by Privatization in Transition Economies

J.-F. Nivet

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This paper provides a precise and critical rereading of theories, developed before the 1990s, able to justify why privatization has been considered as a central component of transition in post-socialist countries, mainly the theory of property rights, managerial theories of the firm, the positive theory of agency. It highlights their difficulties to fully explain the inefficiency of state enterprises and the superiority of private corporations. It concludes on theoretical missing links, pertaining to the role of state, incompleteness of contracts, laws, uncertainty and entrepreneurship.

Keywords: PRIVATIZATION; OWNERSHIP; PROPERTY RIGHTS; EXTERNALITIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 K4 L2 P5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 77 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:2001.08

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