Pure Equilibria of Repreated Games with Public Information

Tristan Tomala

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The set of payoffs associated to pure uniform equilibria of a repeated game with public information is characterized in terms of the one shot-game. The key of the result is first, a description of equilibrium paths and second, the definition of new types of punishments.

Keywords: ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM; ECONOMETRICS; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:96.06

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