Competitive Strategic Market Games with an Infinite-Dimensional Trade Space

Gaël Giraud

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This paper constructs two feasible strategic market games associated to an economy with infinite-dimensional trade space, finitely many traders, and finitely many firms, such that the set of outcomes induced by pure Nash equilibria coincides with the set of competitive equilibria. In both games, consumers may go bankrupt out of equilibrium, punishment rules are chosen in such a way to be proportional to the failure of a player to honor his/her strategy, and uniform properness of preferences turns out to be the key-tool to get the equivalence Nash/Walras.

Keywords: GAMES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D41 D43 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:97.73

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