Strategic Transmission of Information: A Chracterization

Jérôme Renault

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We characterize, for any model of repeated interaction with incomplete information and signals, the information that players can learn through finite procedures robust to unilateral deviations.

Keywords: ASYMETRIC INFORMATION; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:97.79

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