Preference Aggregation Functions and Arrows Theorem

O. Nomia

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present Arrow's theorem and more generally the common framework of many results which can be called "Arrovian theorems". One begins by recalling the Condorcet majority rules, and why they fail: the "effet Condorcet". These rules are examples of preference aggregation functions defined by a simple game, and then one seeks if in the class of all these functions one can find functions avoiding this problem.

Keywords: GAMES; PREFERENCE CHOICES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:97.90

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