Competitive Strategic Market Games

Gaël Giraud

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We present a fairly simple, feasible, price-quantity strategic market game for pure-exchange economies with finitely many agents, such that the set of pure Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of competitive equilibria. Our set-up encompasses incomplete, non-convex, non-transitive, and discontinuous preferences with externalities. We call such a market-game Nash-competitive.

Keywords: GAMES; PREFERENCE CHOICES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D41 D43 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1998
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Working Paper: On Competitive Strategic Market Games (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:98.08

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