Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing
Antoine Billot (),
Alain Chateauneuf (),
Itzhak Gilboa () and
Jean-Marc Tallon ()
Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications from UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1)
In an exchange economy with no aggregate uncertainty, and Bayesian agents, Pareto optimal allocations provide full insurance if and only if the agents have a common prior. It is hard to explain why there is relatively so little betting taking place. One is led to ask, when are full insurance allocations optimal for uncertainty averse agents? it turns out that commonality of beliefs, appropriately defined, is key again.
Keywords: OPTIMIZATION; UTILITY FUNCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
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Journal Article: Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing (2000)
Working Paper: Sharing Beliefs: between Agreeing and Disagreeing (2000)
Working Paper: Sharing beliefs: between agreeing and disagreeing (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:98.30
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