Equity, Fairness Equilibria and Coordination in the Ultimatum Game

C. Meidinger

Papiers du Laboratoire de Microéconomie Appliquée from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: It is well known that all the experimental results concerning the Ultimatum game are at variance with its single subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. We use here Rabin's concepts of equity and fairness equilibrium to investigate these results and analyse the coordination problem of that game.

Keywords: EQUITY; GAMES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:parima:1997-5

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