Alternative Investment Performance Fee Arrangements and Implication for SEC Regulatory Policy: A Comment

William Margrabe

Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers from Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research

Abstract: Working from the assumption that Modigliani and Pogue made in their recent article, I (1) explain why there is no incentive for a portfolio manger to prefer their Plan 1 fee over their Plan 2 fee, (2) explain why the portfolio manager and investment company are superfluous, and (3) rebut the authors’ unduly pessimistic conclusions about portfolio manager behavior in an unregulated capital market.

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