A Note on Clienteles and the Miller Model (Revised: 5-88)

Franklin Allen and Jeffrey A. Jaffe

Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers from Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research

Abstract: There is some empirical evidence that high tax bracket investors hold the equity of unlevered firms while low tax bracket investors hold levered firms. It has been suggested that an extension of the Miller model can provide a theory which is consistent with this observation. However, it has been stated elsewhere that this separation arises only for some sequences of shareholder voting and trading, implying that solid theoretical support for the existence of clienteles is lacking. This note argues that the sequencing of trading and voting does not affect the formation of capital structure clienteles.

References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Clienteles and the Miller Model (Revised: 5-88)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pennfi:04-87

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers from Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().