Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream
Maitreesh Ghatak (),
Massimo Morelli () and
Working Papers from Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics
This paper introduces an overlapping generations model of the principal-agent problem. all individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Bargaining power and incentive contracts in the principle-agent relationships are determined by market forces.
Keywords: MORAL HAZARD; GENERATIONS; INFORMATION; LABOUR; INCENTIVES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D82 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pensta:1-00-1
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