Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream

Maitreesh Ghatak, Massimo Morelli () and Tomas Sjostrom

Working Papers from Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper introduces an overlapping generations model of the principal-agent problem. all individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Bargaining power and incentive contracts in the principle-agent relationships are determined by market forces.

Keywords: MORAL HAZARD; GENERATIONS; INFORMATION; LABOUR; INCENTIVES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D82 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pensta:1-00-1

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