Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs

Eric Bond and K.J. Crocker

Working Papers from Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics

Keywords: insurance; information; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1993
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Journal Article: Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs (1997)
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