Competition Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals

Eric Bond, Thomas Gresik and T.A.

Working Papers from Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Competition between asymmetrically informed principals (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pensta:11-95-13

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().