Incentive Compatible Information Transfer Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals

Eric Bond and Thomas Gresik

Working Papers from Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, the authors use a model of tax competition to study the role of information sharing in common agency problems.

Keywords: INFORMATION; GAME THEORY; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pensta:8-98-1

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