Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets

Georges Dionne () and N.A. Doherty

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Keywords: insurance; information; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 1993
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets (1994)
Working Paper: Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation: Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets (1991)
Working Paper: Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation: Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets (1991)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9301

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