Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations

Francoise Forges and Enrico Minelli

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.

Keywords: EXPECTATIONS; GAMES; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations (1997)
Working Paper: Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations (1996)
Working Paper: Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9605

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX..
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().