On Second-Best Compensation

Walter Bossert, Marc Fleurbaey and Dirk Van de gaer

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: This paper examines how the first-best models of compensation based on the agents' talents and responsabilities analyzed in some recent contributions can be extended to a second-best context. A few social criteria are proposed and compared to alternative approaches by Roemer and Van de gaer.

Keywords: MATHEMATICS; CONTRACTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C00 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: On second-best compensation (1996)
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