Private Versus Public Product Labeling

Jean-Marc Bourgeon and B. Coestier

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: A market with asymmetric information on product quality that entails both adverse selection and moral hazard problems is considered.

Keywords: INFORMATION; MANAGEMENT; PRODUCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L14 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Private Versus Public Product Labeling (1996)
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