On the design of Optimal Insurance Policies Under Manipulation of Audit Cost
Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.
This paper characterizes optimal insurance policies under deterministic auditing, in a situation where the policyholders can misrepresent their losses.
Keywords: INSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost (2000)
Working Paper: On the design of optimal insurance policies under manipulation of audit cost (1996)
Working Paper: On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9620
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