On the design of Optimal Insurance Policies Under Manipulation of Audit Cost

Pierre Picard

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: This paper characterizes optimal insurance policies under deterministic auditing, in a situation where the policyholders can misrepresent their losses.

Keywords: INSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost (2000)
Working Paper: On the design of optimal insurance policies under manipulation of audit cost (1996)
Working Paper: On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9620

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