Aggregation of Preferences with a Variable set of Alternatives

Jean-François Laslier

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: A social choice correspondence called the Essential Set is studied with the help of an axiom called Cloning Consistency.

Keywords: SOCIAL; CHOICE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1996
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Journal Article: Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives (2000)
Working Paper: Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9628

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