Strategic Uniformed Traders

L. Augier and M. Mokrane

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: We analyze the choice of financial instruments to issue for a firm in a context where informational asymmetries exist in credit relationships. Investors are heterogenous since they do not possess identical firm-specific information. We generalize Boot and Thakor's (1993) approach but depart from their idea that asset splitting is facilitated by the presence of uninformed noisy traders.

Keywords: TRADE; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 G11 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9739

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