Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing
Marie-Cecile Fagart and
Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.
We provide a characterization of an optimal insurance contract (coverage schedule and audit policy) when the monitoring procedure is random. When the policyholder exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, the optimal contract involves a positive indemnity payment with a deductible when the magnitude of damages exceeds a threshold.
Keywords: INSURANCE; RISK AVERSION; AUDITING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Journal Article: Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing (1999)
Working Paper: Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing (1998)
Working Paper: Optimal insurance under random auditing (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9808
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX..
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().