regulation by Negociation: On the Role of Private Benefits

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky and Pierre Picard

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: This paper analyses the role of non-pecuniary private benefits going to employees in an incomplete contract approach to the regulation of utilities.

Keywords: REGULATION; CONTRACTS mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 9 2001 Nanterre CEDEX. 24p. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 H10 L30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Working Paper: Regulation by negotiation:on the role of private benefits (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9809

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