Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences

Josep E. Peris and M.C. Sanchez

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the explicit representation of fixed agenda social choice correspondences under different rationality assumptions (independence, neutrality, monotonicity,...).It is well known in the literature that, under some of these assumptions, the existence of dictators, oligarchies or individuals with veto power can be proven; butno information about the social choice set is obtained.

Keywords: SOCIAL CHOICE; MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Working Paper: Fixed agenda social choice correspondences (1998)
Working Paper: - FIXED AGENDA SOCIAL CHOICE CORRESPONDENCES (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9811

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