Information Structure, Labour Contracts and the Strategic Use of Debt

K. Dachraoui and Georges Dionne ()

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: In this research, we introduce information structure as a variable to explain differences in salary profiles and rates of separation among firm.

Keywords: LABOUR CONTRACTS; INFORMATION; WAGES U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 9 2001 Nanterre CEDEX. 30p. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J40 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information structure, labor contracts and the strategic use of debt (1999)
Working Paper: Information structure, labour contracts and the strategic use of debt (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9834

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