Protecting Minorities through Voting Rules

Régis Renault and Alain Trannoy

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: With too much disparity in opinions, minorities may question the legitimacy of majority voting and indermine the unity of the group through political violence or civil disobedience. Properties of an average vvoting rule are investigated here, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. Voters typically misrepresent their tastes by taking extreme stands. Conditions ensuring that average voting favors a minority more than the majority voting are derived. They are used to show that in actual applications of average voting, crucial factors are the correlation between wealth and tastes and the progressiveness of taxes.

Keywords: SOCIAL CHOICE; VOTING; MINORITY GROUPS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H41 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1999
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Working Paper: Protecting minorities through voting rules (1999)
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