Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products

Jean-Christophe Bureau, Estelle Gozlan and Stéphan Marette ()

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: Focusing on the issue of food safety, the authors consider a framework of repeated purchases where adverse selection from imperfect information on product quality exists. Countries are characterized by their unequal ability to control quality.

Keywords: INFORMATION; FOOD INDUSTRY; INTERNATIONAL TRADE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 F13 L66 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products (2001)
Working Paper: Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products (2001)
Working Paper: Quality signaling and international trade in food products (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-13

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