Surveys anmd Incentives: a Principal-Agent-Users Model

Touria Jaaidane

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: The author is interested in whether it is worth producing information, th rough surveys, in order to design a quality regulation mechanism when dealing with public services. He studies a principal-agent-users model in which quality is jointly produced by both the agent and the users thanks to their effort levels.

Keywords: PUBLIC GOODS; REGULATION; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1999
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Working Paper: Surveys and incentives: A principal-agent-users model (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-14

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