L'impact de la negociation et des prises de controle sur l'ampleur de l'effet de Cliquet

Gilles Chemla ()

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: This paper considers a long-term relationship between a firm and a privately informed trading partner, say a buyer, when both parties bargain over a price in each period and when a toakeover may take place.

Keywords: STRUCTURES DES MARCHES; INFORMATION; FINANCEMENT DE L'ENTREPRISE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 G32 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1999
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Working Paper: L'impact de la négociation et des prises de contrôle sur l'ampleur de l 'effet de Cliquet (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-19

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