Dividing One Euro, Democratically

Jean-François Laslier and Nathalie Picard

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: In this paper, concepts from the theory of electoral competition are applied to the classical problem of dividing one unit of a homogeneous good. If the Uncovered set selects almost all divisions, other concepts (Minimal Covering set, Bipartisan set) predict that very unequal divisions are not selected.

Keywords: INCOME REDISTRIBUTION; SOCIAL CHOICE; VOTING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Dividing one euro democratically (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-23

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