Inequality Decomposition Values: the Trade-Off Between Marginality and Consistency

Frédéric Chantreuil and Alain Trannoy

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: A general procedure inspired by the Shapley value is proposed for decompodsing any inequality index by factor components or by populations subgroups. To do so we define two types of inequality games. Although these games cannot be expressed in terms of unanimity games, an axiomatization of the Shapley decomposition is provided in this context by using the Potential function pioneered by HArt and Mas-Colell (89).

Keywords: SOCIAL WELFARE; GAME THEORY; INEQUALITY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Inequality decomposition values: the trade-off between marginality and consistency (1999)
Working Paper: Inequality decomposition values: the trade-off between marginality and consistency (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-24

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