Cartel Stability and Quality Signaling

Stéphan Marette () and J.M. Crepsi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: John M. Crespi

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: Under Cournot and Bertrand cases, cartel stability is investigated in a context of adverse selection, where consumers are imperfectly informed about the products quality. Producers' collusion may be necessary to signal quality via a third-party certification or a price. In particular, cases with and without economies of scale concerning third-party certification are examined.

Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES; MARKET STRUCTURE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 1999
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Working Paper: Cartel stability and suality signalling (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-29

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