A Class of Games with Positive Value of Information

B. Bassan, Olivier Gossner, Marco Scarsini and Shmuel Zamir (shmuelzamir@gmail.com)

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: It is well known that, whereas in one-agent contexts the value of information is always positive, in strategic situations, this is not always the case. We will consider the class of games for which, under a specific information structure, there exists a unique Pareto payoff profile, and we show that any Nash-equilibrium payoff profile induced by a coarser information structure is Pareto dominated by this unique Pareto payoff profile. Therefore for these games the value of information is positive.

Keywords: INFORMATION; GAME THEORY; UNCERTAINTY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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