Disciplined Discretion: Monetary Targeting in Germany and Switzerland

Thomas Laubach and Adam Posen

Princeton Essays in International Economics from International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,

Abstract: This essay offers an analysis of actual German and Swiss monetary policy that explains this gap between operation and performance. It shows that neither country's central bank can be called a monetary targeter, according to a strict, formal definition of targeting, and it argues that the historical record shows a different use for announced monetary targets in these countries.

Keywords: MONETARY POLICY; CENTRAL BANKS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:priifi:206

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