The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence

Sylvester Eijffinger and Jakob de Haan

Princeton Studies in International Economics from International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,

Abstract: It is often argued that a high level of central-band independence coupled with an explicit mandate that the bank aim for price stability are important institutional devices for maintaining that stability. Indeed, a number of countries have recently increased the independence of their central banks in order to raise their commitment to price stability.

Keywords: CENTRAL BANKS; MONETARY POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 82 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (254)

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Working Paper: The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:prinfi:19

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