TAX COMPLIANCE AND CORRUPTION DETERRENCE: THE ROLE OF WAGE INCENTIVES

Timothy Besley and John McLaren

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper

Keywords: taxes; corruption; wages; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:priwdp:44

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