LAWYERS AS AGENTS OF THE DEVIL IN A PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper

Keywords: lawyers; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1990
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Journal Article: Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (2013)
Working Paper: Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (2013)
Working Paper: Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (1993)
Working Paper: Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (1990)
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