Group Lending, Repayment Incentives And Social Collateral
Timothy Besley () and
Stephen Coate ()
Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies
Keywords: bank loans; game theory; financial term; developing countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
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Journal Article: Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:priwds:152
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