Monitoring And Wage Incentives: Capitulation Vs. Efficiency Wages

Timothy Besley and John McLaren

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program

Keywords: economic equilibrium; enterprises; economic models; welfare; taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:priwol:70

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