Relative Profit Auctions

K. Steiglitz and G. Reis

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs

Abstract: We study independent private value auctions where bidders have preferences over relative payoffs.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; EXPERIMENTS; BIDDING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:priwpu:214

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