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Willpower and Personal Rules

Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs

Abstract: Much of the literature on time inconsistency has studied the external commitment devices that individuals use to address their self-control problems: tying oneself to the mast, staying away from temptation, holding illiquid assets, or "asking controls" from others. This paper, by contrast, focuses on internal commitment mechanisms or personal rules (diets, exercices regiments, resolutions, moral or religious precepts, etc.) through which people attempt, to achieve self discipline.

Keywords: PSYCHOLOGY; ECONOMICS; MOTIVATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C70 D60 D91 E21 J22 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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