Moral hazard and Risk Speading in Partnerships

Martin Gaynor and Paul Gertler

Working Papers from RAND - Reprint Series

Abstract: Partnerships provide a classic of tradoff between risk spreading and moral hazard. The degree to which firms choose to spread risk and sacrifice efficiency incentive s depends upon risk preferences, for which data are typically unavailable. We use a unique dataset on medical group practice to investigate this tradoff.

Keywords: RISK; HEALTH INSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 I10 I19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:randrs:96-09

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