Contracting Structures for Custom Software Development: The Impacts of Efficient Investments and Imperfect Knowledge on Internal Development and Outsourcing

E.T.G. Wang, T. Barron and A. Seidmann

Working Papers from Rochester, Business - Computer and Information Systems

Abstract: Custom software development projects have special informational attributes that have challenged managers for many years: they are associated with information asymmetries regarding user valuation and developer costs, relationship-specific investments, and a resulting likelihood of externalities for theuser or the developer from the other party's investment.

Keywords: BARGAINING; SOFTWARE; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION; EXTERNALITIES; INVESTMENTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:robuco:96-01

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