Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
Ching-to Ma ()
Working Papers from Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics
Keywords: contracts; economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts (1994)
Working Paper: Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:stante:29
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