Collusion Among Interest Groups: Foreign Aid and Rent-Dissipation
Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies
This paper develops a game-theoretic model of public policy in a developing country in order to explain a number of empirical regularities. It is shown that under certain circumstances, and increase in government revenue will be completly crowded out by incresed rent dissipation, leaving the provision of public goods unaltered.
Keywords: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; FOREIGN AID; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 O2 F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
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Working Paper: Collusion Among Interest Grops: Foreign Aid and Rent Dissipation (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:stocin:610
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